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We characterize the trade-offs among firms’ compliance strategies in a market-based program wherea regulator interested in controlling emissions from a given set of sources auctions off a fixed
number of emissions permits. We model a three-stage game in which firms invest in emissions
abatement, participate in a share auction for permits, and produce output. We develop a methodology
for a profit-maximizing firm to derive its marginal value function for permits and translate this value
function into an optimal bidding strategy in the auction. We analyze two end-product market scenar-
ios—independent demands and Cournot competition. In both scenarios we find that changing the
number of available permits influences abatement to a lesser extent in a dirty industry than in a cleaner
one. In addition, abatement levels taper off with increasing industry dirtiness levels. In the presence of
competition, firms in a relatively clean industry can, in fact, benefit from a reduction in the number of
available permits. Our findings are robust to changes in certain modeling assumptions.
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1. Introduction
Market-based policy instruments are now being con-
sidered for a range of environmental issues, from en-
dangered species preservation to the greenhouse ef-
fect and global climate change (The Wall Street Journal
2006, 2005a,b,c; Stavins 1998). Emissions trading pro-
grams for pollutants such as lead, sulfur dioxide (SO2),
nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon dioxide (CO2), and vol-
atile organic compounds (VOCs), are prime examples.
Notably, the EU greenhouse gas Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), which came into force in 2005, caps CO2
emissions from more than 12,000 industrial plants and
is a precursor to similar systems that will be imple-
mented under the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions trading
refers to a market-based mechanism that allows par-
ties to buy and sell permits to emit certain pollutants.
It differs from the traditional command-and-control
approach that relies on an agency, usually the govern-
ment, to issue standards and specific directives on the
amounts by which firms must reduce their emissions,
how they must do so, and the penalties for failure
(NRTEE 2002). The total number of permits issued
corresponds to the overall emissions target of the cov-
ered sources. The fact that the target is less than “busi-
ness as usual” emissions creates permit scarcity, re-
sulting in a market price for permits. The concept of
emissions trading has evolved into a central idea in
environmental regulation, with well-developed theory
[see Tietenberg (2001) for a comprehensive collection
of articles on emissions trading], and attention has
now shifted to how trading programs should be im-
plemented (Muller and Mestelman 1998).
Most research to date has focused on evaluating the
efficacy of emissions trading programs vis-a-vis other
approaches such as taxes, subsidies, and standards
from a regulator’s perspective. We instead take the
perspective of a profit-maximizing firm and focus on
the trade-offs among different compliance strategies
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that a firm has at its disposal. We consider three such
strategies—investment in abatement, procurement of
permits, and adjustment of output levels—in a pro-
gram based on auctioned permits. The total number of
permits available to firms is exogenous to our model
and is decided by the regulator. To the regulator,
knowledge about the interrelationships among firm
levers for compliance is crucial given the goals of
pollution control and a desired increasing level of
stringency in pollution limits. From a firm’s perspec-
tive, decisions such as investment in pollution abate-
ment, permit bidding strategy, and production level
must be made given policy stipulations, the accompa-
nying cost of compliance, and the goal of profit max-
imization.
In practice, permits are allocated by “grandfather-
ing” or by auctioning. Grandfathering refers to the
process of allocating permits to firms free of charge,
based on historical emissions or process inputs. Free
allocation is problematic in terms of efficiency because
it conveys scarcity rents to the polluting firms (Fuller-
ton and Metcalf 2001). Grandfathered permits also
give rise to entry barriers, because new entrants must
purchase permits from existing holders (Stavins 1998).
Cramton and Kerr (2002) argue that auctioning is su-
perior to grandfathering because it is much more ef-
ficient, allows reduced tax distortions, provides
greater incentives for innovation, provides more flex-
ibility in distribution of costs, and reduces the need for
politically contentious arguments over the allocation
of rents. Moreover, auctioning serves to increase li-
quidity in permit markets and to facilitate the permit
price discovery process (Schmalensee et al. 1998). De-
spite the apparent economic superiority of auctions
over free distribution, the latter is implemented be-
cause it offers a greater degree of political control over
the distributional effects of regulation (Stavins 1998).
We focus on auctioning as the primary means for
allocating permits but we do provide a brief discus-
sion in Section 7.2 on how our approach can be ex-
tended to incorporate grandfathering in addition to
auctioning.
Permit auctions are implemented in various for-
mats. The US EPA auctions for SO2 permits are in the
sealed-bid discriminatory price format, and the Chi-
cago Climate Exchange (CCX) auctions for CO2 per-
mits are held in two formats—sealed-bid average
price and sealed-bid discriminatory price. We model a
sealed-bid uniform price “share” auction where the
bidders submit a schedule of prices for varying frac-
tions of the block of permits being auctioned and
receive permits at a price that equates demand and
supply. Although permits are sold in discrete units,
modeling a share or divisible-good auction is appro-
priate because permits are homogeneous and the total
number of auctioned permits is generally large
(125,000–150,000 in US EPA auctions of SO2 permits).
It is worth mentioning that analytical results on equi-
libria in divisible good auctions are scarce (Hortaçsu
2002). However, there has been substantial debate on
whether the discriminatory price format or the uni-
form price format is superior (Back and Zender 1993;
Bikhchandani and Huang 1993; Daripa 2001). Our
choice of a uniform price auction is driven by reasons
of analytical tractability. Cramton and Kerr (2002) ar-
gue that when no bidder has significant market
power, uniform pricing is nearly as efficient as Vickrey
pricing and that, among sealed-bid auctions, a uni-
form price auction is probably the best. Despite the
discriminatory price format of auctions for SO2 per-
mits, prices have been in a narrow range. For example,
in the EPA’s March 2006 spot auction for SO2 permits,
the difference between the average and lowest win-
ning bids was 2.61%. In any case, the modeling frame-
work we employ is not limited to our auction format
choice. As results become available in auction theory,
they can be included within our framework.
We consider two scenarios of imperfect competition
in the end-product market. In the first scenario, firms
targeted by the regulator are local monopolies in the
end-product market. An example is the US Acid Rain
Program for restricting SO2 emissions from fossil fuel-
fired electric utilities. In the second scenario, firms
compete for end-customer demand. An example is the
EU emissions trading program for CO2 , which in-
cludes major competitors in the steel industry such as
ThyssenKrupp and Arcelor. In both demand scenar-
ios, however, firms do compete for scarce emissions
permits. We present a methodology by which a firm
can derive its marginal value function for permits and
translate this value function into an optimal bidding
strategy in the auction for permits. In addition, the
modeling effort provides a means for firms to deduce
their optimal levels of abatement and output. We use
the term “abatement” to refer to specific technological
or process changes that result in lower emissions per
unit of output (e.g., through the installation of scrub-
bers) or that result in a reduction in emissions inde-
pendent of output (e.g., through the sequestration of
exhaust gases). This is in contrast to some studies that
refer to abatement as a black-box reduction in emis-
sions from a baseline. In both demand scenarios we
find that increasing stringency through a reduction in
the total number of permits induces lower levels of
abatement from firms in a “dirtier” industry than from
those in a “cleaner” one (the level of dirtiness corre-
sponds to the emissions per unit of output during
production). In addition, abatement levels taper off
with increasing industry dirtiness levels. In the pres-
ence of Cournot competition in the output market,
firms in a relatively clean industry can, in fact, benefit
from a reduction in the number of available permits,
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running counter to the common wisdom that an in-
creasing stringency is detrimental to firm profitability
[also see Bovenberg, Goulder, and Gurney (2004) and
Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002) for related dis-
cussions on the conditions under which firm profits
can be preserved under increasing stringency]. Our
findings are robust to changes in certain modeling
assumptions and help in understanding the trade-offs
among abatement, permits, and output levels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 includes a review of the related literature.
Section 3 describes the model. Sections 4 and 5, respec-
tively, treat the two end-product market scenarios—
independent demands and Cournot competition. Sec-
tion 6 illustrates our results through a numerical
example. Section 7 extends the analysis to: (i) a variant
of the emissions function, (ii) the possibility that per-
mits can be grandfathered in addition to being auc-
tioned, (iii) the possibility that investment in abate-
ment can affect the cost of production, and, (iv) firm
heterogeneity. We discuss our results and provide
directions for future research in Section 8. Proofs and
tables of results are included in Appendices A and B,
respectively.
2. Literature
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first frame-
work that enables an assessment of compliance strat-
egies in a permit-based program for emissions control
for varying policy stringency and firm dirtiness levels.
Lyon (1986) examines equilibrium properties of a
range of auctions and other procedures for allocating
transferable permits. The paper’s focus is on transfer-
neutral (implying that no net revenue is generated for
the seller) mechanisms that allocate permits effi-
ciently, but production relationships or abatement are
not modeled. Since 1995, the MIT Center for Energy
and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) has pub-
lished a series of empirical studies on the implemen-
tation of the Acid Rain Program in the US, including
EPA auctions for SO2 permits. Laffont and Tirole
(1996a) study the impact of spot and futures markets
for tradable permits on firms’ compliance decisions.
Firms can buy permits, invest in abatement, or stop
production and source out. The authors find that
stand-alone spot markets induce excessive invest-
ment. The introduction of a futures market reduces
this incentive to invest. Laffont and Tirole (1996b)
extend this analysis assuming innovation is a public
good and find that options to pollute at a given strike
price fare better than permits from a social welfare
point of view. However, they treat abatement invest-
ment as well as the choice between investment in
abatement and production as binary decisions. In ad-
dition, they do not model permit auctions. Unold and
Requate (2001) propose a combination consisting of
free permits and a menu of call options when there is
imperfect information about aggregate abatement
costs so that the regulator can approximate the mar-
ginal damage function. The authors, however, do not
model permit auctions, nor do they explicitly model
abatement and production relationships. Sunnevåg
(2003) provides insights, based on numerical scenar-
ios, into two competing permit auction designs—the
standard ascending-clock auction and an alternative
ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey pricing—
where the allocation of permits affects production and
market shares. Montero (2002) compares R&D incen-
tives under four policy instruments—emission stan-
dards, performance standards, tradeable permits, and
auctioned permits—with various strategic interactions
in permit and output markets. Equilibrium permit
price for the case of auctioned permits is established
via a Nash bargaining argument in a two-player
game—independent of the auction format. This is in
contrast to our explicit derivation of the equilibrium
bidding strategy and permit price based on the mar-
ginal value function for permits and on the auction
format. Montero (2002) focuses on R&D incentives in
contrast to our characterization of the trade-offs
among compliance levers. Bovenberg, Goulder, and
Gurney (2004) and Smith, Ross, and Montgomery
(2002) analyze the “equity-efficiency trade-off” in a
general equilibrium model and focus on the fraction of
permits that a regulator would want to allocate freely
to firms to preserve industry profits. The regulator
uses the revenue raised from permit auctions to lower
distortionary taxes on factor inputs such as capital and
labor. Our focus, on the other hand, is on understand-
ing firm behavior under an exogenously specified
emissions cap. Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003) model
a three-stage process of innovation, diffusion, and
emissions abatement in an oligopoly where firms are
price takers. They compare the welfare effects of emis-
sions taxes, auctioned permits, and grandfathered per-
mits. One or many of the firms innovate and the rest
are “adopters.” Production relationships are not ex-
plicitly treated and the equilibrium permit price for
the case of auctioned permits is exogenously specified.
None of the above papers explicitly models invest-
ment in abatement, permit valuation and bidding, and
output together with insights into equilibrium reac-
tions of firms for varying stringency and dirtiness
levels.
There is a growing stream of literature in operations
management that studies the interface between oper-
ational decisions and the environment, at both the
strategic and the tactical level [see Guide and Wassen-
hove (2006a,b); Kleindorfer, Singhal, and Van Wassen-
hove (2005); Corbett and Kleindorfer (2001a,b), and
the papers referenced therein]. A range of topics has
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been studied in the context of closed-loop supply
chains, including facility location, product and process
design, inventory management, yield management,
the value of information, contracts, and the impact of
competition [e.g., Bakal and Akçali (2006); Ferguson
and Toktay (2006); Debo, Toktay, and Van Wassen-
hove (2005); Savaskan, Bhattacharya, and Van Was-
senhove (2003); Rajaram and Corbett (2002); and Stu-
art, Ammons, and Turbini (1999)]. We complement
the aforesaid by analyzing compliance strategies for
firms under explicit regulatory constraints during the
process of production.
3. Model
We model a three-stage game in a symmetric oligop-
oly. In the first stage, each of the n  2 firms decides
its abatement level i from an investment i
2 in pol-
lution mitigation (e.g., investments that enable the use
of cleaner inputs or the scrubbing of flue gases). Qua-
dratic abatement costs are commonly modeled in the
literature [e.g., see Kennedy (2002) and Parry and
Toman (2002)] and reflect diminishing returns to
abatement investments. We model abatement as the
first-stage decision since it is typically a long-term
decision made at an early stage within the planning
horizon. In programs such as the US EPA’s SO2 permit
program, a prespecified number of permits is auc-
tioned off every year—a rate that is usually faster than
the abatement investment cycle [also see Ellerman
(1998)]. In the second stage of our model, firms bid for
permits in a sealed-bid uniform price share auction
conducted by the regulator. Note that if the abatement
investment cycle is faster than the permit supply cycle,
a sequence of decisions where the allocation of per-
mits precedes the abatement decision might be more
appropriate. However, analysis of such a sequence is
intractable due to the complex permit valuation func-
tion that results (permit valuation is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.1). Each firm submits a schedule of prices for
varying fractional shares of the total available permits.
The regulator then selects the market clearing price
such that total demand equals the available supply. As
in Wilson (1979), we assume that the number of bid-
ders is known beforehand by all participants to be n.
The auction results in a share allocation vector s  (s1,
s2, . . . , sn) or, equivalently, a permit allocation vector
  (1, 2, . . . , n). B  ¥i1
n i is the total permissible
pollution level, where i  siB. The regulator’s choice
of the target B is assumed to be exogenous to the
model. Each permit allows a firm to emit one unit of
the pollutant; e is the permit price. In the third stage,
each firm i produces output yi, which results in a
pollution level [/(1  i)]yi, and firms redeem their
permits against their pollution levels.  is the emis-
sions per unit of output and defines the cleanliness of
firms or, equivalently, of technologies employed. The
aforementioned functional form of the pollution level
is representative of that in industries such as electric
utilities [see Burtraw (2000) and Montero and Eller-
man (1998)]. Section 7.1 treats the case where pollution
reduction is independent of the output level. We do
not model the possibility that firms can trade permits
in a secondary market. Nevertheless, the allocation of
permits is efficient because of the assumption of sym-
metry, and allowing for trade will not change our
results. The unit cost of production is c, which we
assume to be constant in the base model. In Section
7.3, we extend our results to the case where the cost of
production is impacted by abatement efforts. We con-
sider two scenarios of imperfect competition in the
end-product market. In the first case, each firm is a
local monopoly and faces an independent, inverse
demand function pi  a  byi. In the second case, the
n firms compete in a Cournot fashion and face an
inverse total demand function pi  p  â  b̂Y, where
Y  ¥i1
n yi. In practice, unused permits can be banked
for future use or trade. We therefore assume a termi-
nal value of u per unused permit. This value could
represent either the value of an unused permit in a
secondary market or the net present value of benefits
accruing from future use of the permit. We assume
that the penalty for not having the requisite number of
permits to account for emissions is large enough so
that noncompliance is deterred. For example, only 4 of
the more than 2000 units affected by the US Acid Rain
Program were short of permits to cover their emis-
sions for the 2004 compliance year (EPA 2005).
The optimization problem of firm i  1, . . . , n, is








yi 	 i , yi , i  0.
The constraint [/(1  i)]yi 	 i implies that each
firm must have sufficient permits to account for emis-
sions. Denote ̃i : /(1  i). We drop the subscript
i where unambiguous, for notational and typographic
convenience. We focus on symmetric subgame perfect
Nash equilibria.
4. Independent Demands
We begin with the independent demands case in
which firms compete for scarce permits but do not
compete in the end-product market. Analysis of each
of the subgames follows.
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4.1. Production Subgame
Given abatement levels and a permit allocation vector,
a representative firm’s optimization problem in the
third stage of the game is
Maximize y   a  byy  	  ̃y
u
 2  e  cy
Subject to: ̃y 	 , y  0.
 is concave in y; y* : min {(a  c  ̃u)/2b, /̃}
is the profit-maximizing quantity, assuming u  (a
 c)/̃. Since each unit produced results in ̃ units of
emissions, /̃ is the maximum production quantity
that keeps emissions within the allowable limit. (c
 ̃u) can be interpreted as the “effective” marginal
cost of production, which is the sum of the variable
cost c and the opportunity cost ̃u since a terminal
value equal to ̃u is lost as a result of producing one
unit of output and emitting ̃ units of pollutant. An
upper bound on the incremental contribution from a
permit is (a  c)/̃. If u exceeds this bound then there
is no incentive to engage in production in the third
stage and firms would trivially salvage permits.
Note that the emissions constraint binds when /̃
 (a  c  ̃u)/2b, i.e., when    : ̃(a  c
 ̃u)/2b. Firm profit can then be written as follows:
Case (i). When    , y*  /̃, and equilibrium
firm profit is
*C   (a  c)̃  e  b̃2 2  2. (1)
Case (ii). When    , y*  (a  c  ̃u)/2b, and
equilibrium firm profit is
*U  
  u  e, (2)
where 
  (1/b)[a  (c  ̃u)/2]2  2 is the uncon-
strained profit from production, given the abatement
level chosen in the first stage.
4.2. Auction Subgame
Firms bid for permits in a uniform price sealed-bid
auction organized by the regulator. In order to deter-
mine its bidding strategy, a firm must anticipate the
outcome of the production subgame where one permit
is redeemed for each unit of emissions generated in
the process of production. Thus, the value placed by a
firm on a permit in the auction is determined endog-
enously by the marginal revenue associated with that
permit in the subsequent production subgame. This is
in contrast to most of the auctions literature where the
value placed by a bidder on the item(s) being auc-
tioned is specified exogenously or is assumed to be
drawn from an exogenous distribution. We elaborate
on the construction of the “marginal value function”
and discuss its properties.
4.2.1. Marginal Value Function. Let v() denote
the firm’s marginal revenue from an additional permit
when it owns  permits, i.e., *C/  v()  e. From
(1) and (2), we have







 :   , (3)
and when    ,
v  u, (4)
where   (a  c)/̃ and   2b/̃2 are constants,
given the abatement level chosen in the first stage.
Note that     u and when    , v()  u. The
case when    is trivial because the emissions
constraint does not bind and firms’ production deci-
sions are unaffected by the availability of permits. The
value then placed on a permit is simply its terminal
value. We therefore assume for the remainder of the
paper that firms operate in the region defined by i
  i @i and that their beliefs are also restricted to this
region. This is a key assumption and essentially im-
plies that each firm faces a capacity constraint because
of scarce emissions permits in the production sub-
game. Under any effective cap and trade program, the
availability of permits would constrain profit-maximi-
zation or “business as usual” and would result in a
market price for permits.
Thus, the value function is restricted to be v()  
 . Since the emissions constraint binds, the mar-
ginal value of a permit is the shadow price corre-
sponding to the emissions constraint. Note that (a
 c)/̃ is the marginal value of a permit when the
abatement level is  and no permits are held. Given
the abatement level, as the number of permits secured
() increases, we get closer to the unconstrained profit-
maximizing quantity. The marginal value of a permit
thus decreases at the rate 2b/̃2. The function v() is
crucial in establishing an equilibrium of the auction
and in understanding the trade-offs inherent in firm
strategies for compliance. We therefore elaborate on
its behavior below.
Properties of v().
i. [v()]/  0 for   [(a  c)  4b]/4b.
Since firms are capacity constrained by the avail-
ability of permits, the attractiveness of expand-
ing capacity through permits increases in initial
abatement levels. However, for   [(a  c)
 4b]/4b, capacities are relatively large and
capacity increases through permits yield de-
creasing value.
ii. [v()]/  0 for   [4b(1  )]/(a  c). As
the capacity constraint gets tighter with increas-
ing , a firm would be willing to pay more for an
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additional permit. Beyond a threshold, however,
emissions per unit of output are relatively high
and additional permits do not significantly ex-
pand capacity, leading to declining value of per-
mits (see Figure 1). Also, [v()]/  [2b(1
 )2]/2  0 and 2[v()]/ }  [4b(1
 )2]/3  0, implying that as  increases the
permit allocation  has a decreasing influence
on the valuation of permits.
iii. v() decreases in the unit cost of production c;
i.e., [v()]/c  (1/̃)  0. For higher cost of
production, contribution per increment of out-
put is lower and hence a lower value is placed
on permits.
iv. v() decreases in the price sensitivity of demand
b; i.e., [v()]/b  (2/̃2)  0. For higher
price sensitivity, the larger drop in price from an
additional unit of production results in a lower
marginal value of permits.
4.2.2. Equilibrium Bidding Strategy. We are now
ready to establish an equilibrium of the second-stage
game in which firms participate in a sealed-bid uni-
form price share auction for emissions permits. Each
firm derives its marginal value function as discussed
above. A strategy of a firm specifies a schedule of
prices for varying fractions of the total available per-
mits B. The regulator sets the price such that demand
equals supply. As in Wilson (1979), we assume that no
firm has proprietary information about demand, emis-
sions, and cost functions and, therefore, about the
derived marginal value functions. Symmetry implies
that firms have a common marginal value function for
permits. Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium re-
sults.
Lemma 1. For the share auction in the second stage, it is
an optimal strategy for a firm to submit a schedule such that
at each price e, the requested number of permits is (e)  B[1
 2e/(n  B)]/(n  1). The equilibrium price is e* 
1
2[  (B/n)], and the equilibrium number of permits
received by each firm is *  B/n.
Proof. The proposed equilibrium satisfies n  (e*)
 B. We show that if the (n  1) firms other than firm
i submit the schedule (e), then it is optimal for firm i
to also submit the same schedule (e). Assume that
firms j  i submit the schedule (e) and i submits some
schedule (e). The clearing price e* satisfies
 e*  B  n  1e*








 e*   2e*Bn  B  2e*Bn  B
 2 e*Bn  B2   2e*2Bn  B. (5)
The function on the right-hand side of (5) is concave in
e* and is maximized with respect to e* when
2Bn  B  4B2e*  4Bn  Be*  0,
i.e., when e*  12[  (B/n)]. This is exactly the price
that will result if firm i submits the schedule (e). The
result follows. 
We have thus derived a valuable piece of informa-
tion from this subgame, namely, equilibrium permit
price. A methodological contribution of our paper lies
in the generalization of Wilson’s (1979) analysis of
share auctions. In Wilson (1979), the value of a share is
proportional to the share fraction. But, as is the case
with auctions for emissions permits, it is more likely
that the marginal value a bidder places on the items
being auctioned decreases with the share fraction. Al-
though we do not establish uniqueness of our equilib-
rium solution, it is the only plausible one that can be
deduced [also see Wilson (1979)]. If asymmetric equi-
libria do exist in this symmetric game, they are not
likely to be intuitively reasonable.
4.3. Abatement Subgame
In the first stage of the game, each firm decides the
level of abatement, anticipating the equilibrium num-
ber of permits it will secure in the auction and the
(constrained) output it will be able to produce. Sub-
stituting the equilibrium permit price and permit
share from Lemma 1 into (1), a firm’s optimization
problem can be written as
Maximize *C 
Ba  c1  
2n  
2
Figure 1 Marginal Value of a Permit, v(), versus 
(a  2000, b  5, c  200,   0.5).
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Subject to:   0.
Proposition 1 provides the equilibrium abatement
level.
Proposition 1. *C is concave in . *  B(a  c)/
4n uniquely maximizes *C.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Table 4 in Appendix B summarizes equilibrium re-
sults. Proposition 2 describes the effects of two impor-
tant parameters in our model—the number of avail-
able permits B and the state of current technology
manifested in the emissions  per production
unit—on equilibrium abatement *, permit price e*,
output y*, and profit *C.
Proposition 2. Assume that the emissions constraint
binds for all firms. We have
a. y*/B  0; *C/B  0; */B  0;
b. y*/  0; *C/  0; */  0; ? e1 such
that e*/  0 for   e1;
c. 2y*/B   0; 2*C/B   0; 
2*/B   0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The behavior of equilibrium output and profit with
respect to the total number of permits B is intuitive. As
B increases, each firm secures a larger number of
permits in the auction, leading to higher effective ca-
pacity, higher output, and profit. However, the behav-
ior of equilibrium abatement with respect to the num-
ber of available permits is not so straightforward. It
might be expected that abatement and permits to pol-
lute are substitute strategies for compliance; i.e., when
more permits become available, firms would engage
in lower levels of abatement (Buonanno et al. 2001).
However, since firms are assumed to be always con-
strained by permits, an increase in the number of
available permits expands capacity, and the larger
capacity makes investment in abatement more attrac-
tive since emissions reductions apply to a larger num-
ber of production units.
Ceteris paribus, firms in a dirtier industry produce
lower output and make smaller profits than firms in a
cleaner industry, and altering the number of available
permits influences output and profit to a lesser extent
in a dirtier industry than in a cleaner industry. More-
over, firms in dirtier industries invest less in abate-
ment (in absolute terms) than firms in cleaner indus-
tries. This behavior may appear surprising, but can be
understood when we recall that the emissions con-
straint effectively acts as a capacity constraint on
firms’ output decisions. Dirty firms (with large ) face
a relatively tighter constraint than cleaner firms and
thus produce lower output, making a lower level of
investment optimal. We also note that as the regulator
varies the total number of permits (thus varying the
stringency of the policy), cleaner firms adjust their
abatement investments to a larger extent than dirty
firms. This is related to the valuation of permits (see
Figure 1). Capacity expansion through incremental
permits or abatement does not bring as much benefit
at higher levels of .
5. Cournot Competition
Strategic interactions in oligopoly markets can signif-
icantly affect investments in capacity and R&D
(Montero 2002). In this section, we analyze situations
where firms not only compete for permits in the auc-
tion but also compete for customer demand in a
Cournot fashion.
5.1. Production Subgame
The optimization problem faced by a representative
firm in the third stage of the game is
Maximize y   â  b̂Yy  	  ̃y
u
 2  e  cy,
Subject to: ̃y 	 , y  0
where Y  ¥i1
n yi. The unconstrained equilibrium
output is ỹ  (â  c  ̃u)/b̂(n  1), assuming u  (â
 c)/̃. We again focus on situations where the emis-
sions constraint binds for all firms, i.e., when /̃  (â
 c  ̃u)/b̂(n  1) {or equivalently   ̆, where ̆
 ̃[(â  c  ̃u)/b̂(n  1)]}, in which case Proposition
3 applies.
Proposition 3. Assume that the emissions constraint
binds for all firms. If the abatement level chosen by each firm
in the investment stage is symmetrically , and the number
of permits secured by each firm in the auction stage is
symmetrically , the equilibrium output of each firm in the
third stage of the game where firms compete in a Cournot
fashion is y*  /̃.
Proof. The term /̃ corresponds to the capacity
constraint on a representative firm’s production. In the
absence of this constraint, the equilibrium output
would be ỹ. Since firm profit increases with output in
the range [0, ỹ], each firm produces up to capacity in
equilibrium; the resulting equilibrium output in the
third stage is y*  /̃. 
Let ̂*C denote the equilibrium profit when the emis-
sions constraint binds and ̂*U denote the uncon-
strained equilibrium profit. Let Z denote the total
output of all other firms. We then have:




2  (â  c  ̃e)  b̂Z̃   2. (6)
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Case (ii). When   ̆, y*  (â  c  ̃u)/b̂(n  1),
and
̂*U   â  b̂n â  c  ̃ub̂(n  1) 	 â  c  ̃ub̂(n  1) 
   ̃ â  c  ̃ub̂(n  1) 	u  2  e
 c â  c  ̃ub̂(n  1)   
̂  u  e, (7)
where 
̂  (1/b̂)[(â  c  ̃u)/(n  1)]2  2 is the
unconstrained profit from production, given the
abatement level chosen in the first stage.
5.2. Auction Subgame
As in Section 4.2, a firm’s bidding strategy in the
permit auction is deduced from its marginal value
function v(). We have:
When   ̆,
v   (â  c)  b̂Z̃   2b̂̃2 .








 : ̂  ̂, (8)
when   ̆,
v  u, (9)
where ̂  (â  c)/̃ and ̂  b̂(n  1)/̃2 are con-
stants, given the abatement levels chosen in the first
stage. ̂  ̂̆  u and when   ̆, v()  u. The
behavior of the value function in the case of Cournot
competition is similar to that in the case of indepen-
dent demands. In addition, the marginal value of a
permit decreases in the number of competing firms.
As the market becomes more competitive, the end-
product price approaches the marginal cost of produc-
tion; incremental units of output are therefore less
valuable. We are now in a position to deduce a firm’s
optimal bidding strategy in the auction.
Lemma 2. For the share auction in the second stage, it is
an optimal strategy for a firm to submit a schedule such that
at each price e, the requested number of permits is (e)
 B[1  2e/(n̂  ̂B)]/(n  1). The equilibrium price is
ê*  12[̂  ̂(B/n)], and the equilibrium number of permits
received by each firm is ̂*  B/n.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Substituting the equilibrium permit price and per-
mit share from Lemma 2 into the profit function in (6),
we have
̂*C 





In the abatement subgame, a firm maximizes the profit
function in (10) with respect to abatement . Proposi-
tion 4 provides the equilibrium abatement level.
Proposition 4. ̂*C in (10) is concave in . ̂* 
{[Bn(â  c)  2b̂B2(n  1)]/[2b̂B2(n  1)  42n2]}
uniquely maximizes ̂*C.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
To ensure a nonnegative equilibrium value of abate-
ment, we write ̂*  max {[Bn(â  c)  2b̂B2(n
 1)]/[2b̂B2(n  1)  42n2], 0}. Table 4 in Appendix
B summarizes equilibrium results. Proposition 5 for-
mally describes the behavior of equilibrium abatement
̂*, permit price ê*, output ŷ*, and profit ̂*C with
respect to B and .
Proposition 5. Assume that the emissions constraint
binds for all firms.
For   2b̂B(n  1)/n(â  c), we have ̂*  0 and
a.  ŷ*/B  0; ̂*C/B  0;
b.  ŷ*/  0; ̂*C/  0; ? ê1 such that ê*/ 
0 for   ê1;
c. 2ŷ*/B  0; 2̂*C/B  0.
For   2b̂B(n  1)/n(â  c), we have ̂*  [Bn(â  c)
 2b̂B2(n  1)]/[2b̂B2(n  1)  42n2] and
d.  ŷ*/B  0; ̂*C/B  0; ? ̂1 such that ̂*/B
 0 for   ̂1;
e.  ŷ*/  0; ̂*C/  0; ? ̂1 such that ̂*/
 0 for   ̂1; ? ê2 such that ê*/  0 for 
 ê2;
f. ? ŷ1 such that 
2ŷ*/B  0 for   ŷ1; ? ̂C1
such that 2̂*C/B  0 for   ̂C1; ? ̂2 such
that 2̂*/B)  0 for   ̂2.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The behavior of output with respect to B and  is
intuitive and the explanation is similar to that in Sec-
tion 4. However, the behavior of abatement and firm
profit with respect to B and  is not so obvious. Note
that a firm would invest in abatement only if the
marginal benefit it obtains from that investment ex-









That is, the maximum marginal benefit a firm can
obtain from incremental abatement is [(â  c)/2](B/
n), at   0, where B/n is the equilibrium output
level and corresponds to the capacity constraint faced
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by the firm. This maximum marginal benefit is the
same as that in the independent demands case (see
proof of Proposition 1). However, when firms are
Cournot competitors, expanded production capacity
from abatement has a negative externality on firm
profit; as capacity expands, the price of output drops
and has an adverse impact on profit. A marginal in-
crease in abatement thus leads to a decline in marginal
benefit, proportional to b̂(n  1)(B/n)2. When [(â
 c)/2](B/n)  b̂(n  1)(B/n)2 or, equivalently,
when   2b̂B(n  1)/n(â  c), the firm’s net marginal
benefit from an increase in abatement is negative.
Thus, relatively clean firms invest zero in abatement.
In fact, if the nonnegativity constraint on abatement is
relaxed, firms would have an incentive to increase their
emissions and thus limit production capacity when 
 2b̂B(n  1)/n(â  c).
Figure 2 depicts the behavior of equilibrium firm
profit (at the equilibrium levels of output, permit
price, and abatement) with respect to  for different
values of B. Recall that our analysis applies when the
emissions constraint is binding for all firms. For very
low values of  (not depicted in Figure 2), the emis-
sions constraint does not bind and firm profit is in-
variant with respect to . For relatively clean firms
[i.e.,   2b̂B(n  1)/n(â  c)] that have a binding
emissions constraint, a decrease in the number of
available permits intriguingly results in an increase in
equilibrium profit. As the emissions constraint gets
tighter, firms restrict their output. Lower industry out-
put drives product prices up and, in a Cournot envi-
ronment, results in an increase in firm profit. A similar
explanation applies to the increase in firm profit in this
region as  increases.
However, beyond a certain threshold [i.e.,   2b̂B(n
 1)/n(â  c)], firms’ emissions per unit of output are
large relative to the emissions cap; the capacity con-
straint is therefore stiffer and firms benefit from in-
creases in B. Positive investments in abatement result
and firm profits increase in B. Beyond a point, abate-
ment tapers off with respect to  and is influenced less
by changes in B; the explanation for this behavior is
similar to that detailed for the independent demands
case in Section 4.
6. Numerical Example
Table 1 includes a numerical example that highlights
the results obtained in Sections 4 and 5. Note here that
the total number of permits B constrains profit-maxi-
mization both when firms are clean (  4) and when
firms are dirty (  10). In the case of independent
demands, as B increases, each firm secures more per-
mits, and equilibrium output and profit increase.
Equilibrium abatement increases with the supply of
permits, which is driven by the assumption that firms
are constrained in profit-maximization by the avail-
ability of permits. For the same supply of permits, we
observe higher output and profit when firms are clean
(  4) than when firms are dirty (  10). It can be
verified that equilibrium output and profit are elastic
with respect to , that is, (y*/)  (/y*)  1 and
(*C/)  (/*C)  1. This implies that output and
profit can increase significantly as firms get cleaner.
Indeed, when B  150,000, we find a 281% increase in
output and a 230% increase in profit when  decreases
by 60% from 10 to 4. Abatement levels are higher
when firms are cleaner. As seen in Table 1, for any
level of permit supply, the abatement levels for   4
are greater than those for   10. It can also be verified
that firm profit is elastic to the supply of permits, i.e.,
(*C/B)  (B/*C)  1. A 33% decrease in B from
150,000 to 100,000 results in a 42% decrease in profit
when   4 and a 38% decrease in profit when   10.
A related result is that output is elastic to the supply of
permits, i.e., (y*/B)  (B/y*)  1. This is a useful
result from a regulatory standpoint because an in-
creasing stringency has significant impact on firm out-
put and, hence, on the level of emissions.
In the case of Cournot competition, when   4, an
increase in the supply of permits results in a decrease
in firm profit. This is due to the increase in industry
capacity. The unit price of output drops as a result, as
does firm profit, and firms respond by not engaging in
abatement. In contrast to the independent demands
case, we observe that abatement drops to zero when
the supply of permits goes up from 100,000 to 150,000
for   4. Under Cournot competition, increasing
stringency can be beneficial to firms when they are
relatively clean. From Table 1, we observe that when B
is reduced from 200,000 to 150,000, firm profit increases
by 10% when   4 but decreases by 13% when   10.
Production levels are higher and abatement levels are
lower when   4 than when   10. However, when
Figure 2 Firm Profit, ̂*C, versus 
(â  50000, b̂  125, c  200,   50000, n  25).
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the supply of permits is large, it is possible that firm
profit can be greater in a dirty industry than in a
cleaner one, due to the industry capacity argument
made above. When B  200,000, firm profit is 48,294.88
for   4 and 50,075.77 for   10. For relatively large
, it can be shown that the elasticities for the case of
Cournot competition are structurally similar to those
described above for the case of independent demands.
7. Extensions
In order to test the sensitivity of our results to assump-
tions in the model, we explore four extensions—an
emissions function in which the abatement level is
independent of the volume of production, grandfa-
thering of permits in addition to auctioning, abate-
ment efforts impacting the cost of production, and
firm heterogeneity. Our model is quite robust to these
variations, with our structural results largely continu-
ing to hold. Proofs are omitted for brevity.
7.1. Emissions Function
We consider an emissions function of the form y  S,
where the abatement level S is chosen in the first stage
of the game at a cost S2. Such an emissions function
represents investments made toward fixed-capacity
abatement, as opposed to investments that result in
per-unit reduction in emissions considered in the base
model. Examples include efforts to capture and se-
quester exhaust gases in fixed capacity geologic for-
mations (Brennan and Burruss 2003)—an avenue that
is being actively considered for sequestering CO2.
Equilibrium results are presented in Table 5 in Appen-
dix B. Proposition 6 summarizes the main results for
the case of independent demands.
Proposition 6.
a. y*/B  0; *C/B  0; S*/B  0.
b. y*/  0; *C/  0; ? S1 such that S*/
 0 for   S1; ? e2 such that e*/  0 for   e2.
c. 2y*/B  0; 2S*/B  0; ? C1 such that
2*C/B  0 for   C1.
A comparison with Proposition 2 shows that all
structural attributes of our results are preserved ex-
cept for the behavior of equilibrium abatement. Recall
that, in the base model, abatement impacted emissions
per unit of output; the effective production capacity
for a firm was B(1  )/ (i.e., multiplicative in ).
Therefore, abatement and permits were complemen-
tary strategies and abatement increased with permit
availability. Here, however, abatement reduces emis-
sions by a fixed amount, independent of the output
level; the effective capacity is given by (B  S)/ (i.e.,
additive in S). Therefore, abatement and permits are
substitute strategies and greater permit availability
decreases abatement. Thus, the effect of stringency on
abatement investment by firms depends upon the type
of abatement firms have recourse to. Proposition 7
summarizes the results for the case of Cournot com-
petition.
Proposition 7.
a.  ŷ*/B  0; Ŝ*/B  0; ? ̂C2 , ̂C3 such that
̂*C/B  0 for   ̂C2 , n  3, and ̂*C/B
 0 for   ̂C3 .
b.  ŷ*/  0; ? Ŝ1 such that Ŝ*/  0 for   Ŝ1;
? ̂C4 such that ̂*C/  0 for   ̂C4 ; ?  ê3
such that ê*/  0 for    ê3.
c. 2Ŝ*/B  0; ? ŷ2 such that 
2ŷ*/B  0 for
  ŷ2; ? ̂C5 such that 
2̂*C/B  0 for   ̂C5 .
In particular, we note that with competition in the
end-product market, firms in a relatively clean indus-
try benefit from a reduction in the number of available
permits. As discussed earlier, an increase in the num-
ber of permits increases industry capacity and exerts
downward pressure on the price of output and, hence,
on the profitability of clean firms.
Table 1 Numerical Example
Independent demands Competition
(n  250, a  2000, b  0.3, c  200,   50000) (n  250, â  2000, b̂  0.03, c  200,   50000)
  4   4
B * y* e* * *C ̂* ŷ* ê* ̂* ̂*C
100,000 0.9000 190.00 400.43 400 130,500.00 0.0876 108.76 133.37 400 53,319.98
150,000 1.3500 352.50 466.62 600 226,125.00 0 150.00 83.81 600 53,002.89
200,000 1.8000 560.00 512.40 800 342,000.00 0 200.00 36.75 800 48,294.88
  10   10
B * y* e* * *C ̂* ŷ* ê* ̂* ̂*C
100,000 0.3600 54.40 120.18 400 42,480.00 0.2148 48.59 87.11 400 32,606.83
150,000 0.5400 92.40 134.33 600 68,580.00 0.2136 72.82 75.95 600 43,449.55
200,000 0.7200 137.60 147.70 800 97,920.00 0.1637 93.09 63.94 800 50,075.77
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7.2. Grandfathering in Addition to Auctioning
As discussed earlier, the regulator could possibly
grandfather permits based on historical emissions or
process inputs. Grandfathering can be incorporated
into our model by allowing a fraction  of the total
number of permits B to be grandfathered per firm,
with the remaining fraction 1   offered via the
auction. Working again by backward induction with
the assumption that scarcity of permits constrains
profit maximization, the equilibrium output has a sim-
ilar functional form (given abatement levels) as before.
Although the marginal value of permits decreases
with grandfathering, the smaller number of permits
now available in the auction offsets the decrease in the
value of permits, and the equilibrium permit price too
has a similar functional form (given abatement levels)
as before. However, as expected, equilibrium abate-
ment is lower due to the availability of grandfathered,
free permits. Equilibrium results (see Table 6 in Ap-
pendix B) change accordingly, but most of our struc-
tural results are preserved. Proposition 8 summarizes
results for the case of independent demands.
Proposition 8.
a. y*/B  0; *C/B  0; ? 1
G such that */B
 0 for   1
G .
b. y*/  0; *C/  0; ? 1
G such that */
 0 for   1
G ; ? e1
G such that e*/  0 for 
 e1
G.
A comparison of Propositions 8 and 2 shows that
the behavior of equilibrium output, permit price, and
profit remains unchanged with the introduction of
grandfathering. However, the behavior of equilibrium
abatement changes. Abatement always increases with
permit availability in the independent demands case
of the base model. However, the availability of free,
grandfathered permits increases effective production
capacity significantly when  is low and makes further
capacity expansion through abatement less valuable.
For larger , the capacity constraint is stiffer and
abatement increases with permit availability—as in
the base model. The behavior of abatement with re-
spect to  is similar. Proposition 9 summarizes results
for the case of Cournot competition.
Proposition 9.
For   [2b̂B(n  1)  2b̂B(n  1)]/[n(â  c)(1  )],
we have ̂*  0 and
a.  ŷ*/B  0; ̂*C/B  0;
b.  ŷ*/  0; ̂*C/  0; ? ê1
G such that ê*/
 0 for   ê1
G.
For   [2b̂B(n  1)  2b̂B(n  1)]/[n(â  c)(1  )],
we have ̂*  [Bn(â  c)(1  )  2b̂B2(n  1)
 2b̂B2(n  1)]/[2b̂B2(n  1)  2b̂B2(n  1)
 42n2] and
c.  ŷ*/B  0; ? ̂C1
G ; such that ̂*C/B  0 for 
 ̂C1
G ; ? ̂1
G such that ̂*/B  0 for   ̂1
G ;
d.  ŷ*/  0; ? ̂C1
G such that ̂*C/  0 for 
 ̂C1
G ; ? ̂1
G such that ̂*/  0 for   ̂1
G ; ?
ê2
G such that ê*/  0 for   ê2
G.
A comparison of Propositions 9 (parts c and d) and
5 (parts d and e) indicates that the availability of free
permits accentuates the distinctive effects of B and 
on the profits of firms competing in a Cournot fashion.
7.3. Abatement and the Cost of Production
Abatement efforts might involve the implementation
of resource-efficient processing of materials, translat-
ing into a decrease in unit production cost. On the
other hand, stipulations on emissions levels could ne-
cessitate more sophisticated processing of materials or
the use of more expensive, cleaner materials to miti-
gate emissions, leading to an increase in unit produc-
tion cost. We can incorporate such effects into the base
model by replacing the constant unit cost of produc-
tion c with the function c   where   (c/, ) is
a constant and  is the abatement level. Equilibrium
results are presented in Table 7 in Appendix B. Our
structural results remain unchanged.
7.4. Firm Heterogeneity
In this section, we relax the assumption of symmetry.
Since the game becomes necessarily complicated, we
restrict our analysis to a two-firm game and explore
the effects of heterogeneity in dirtiness levels i, costs
of abatement i, and costs of production ci, i  1, 2.
7.4.1. Independent Demands. We maintain the
assumption that firms are constrained in profit maxi-
mization by the availability of permits. The equilib-
rium output of firm i in the third stage is y*i : i(1
 i)/i. Denote i  (a  ci)(1  i)/i and i  2b(1
 i)
2/i
2. The marginal value function for permits is
v(i)  i  ii. In the auction stage, firm i’s equilib-
rium bidding strategy is i(e)  B  [2(j  i
 iB)e]/[ij  ji  ijB], j  i. Equilibrium per-
mit price is e*  [ij  ji  ijB]/[2(i  j)] and
the equilibrium number of permits received by firm i
is *i : i(e*)  [i  j  jB]/(i  j). Note that *1
 *2  B. The profit function i, after incorporating
equilibrium output, permit price, and permit share, is
a function of both i and j. Equilibrium values of
abatement correspond to the intersection of the two
reaction functions *1(2) and *2(1). Analytical deri-
vation and treatment of these reaction functions is
intractable and we therefore present a numerical ex-
ample in Table 2.
7.4.2. Cournot Competition. Equilibrium output
of firm i is ŷ*i : [i(1  i)]/i . Denote ̂i  [(â  ci)(1
 i)]/i , ̂i  [2b̂(1  i)
2j  b̂(1  i)(1  j)i ]/
i
2j , and   [b̂B(1  i)(1  j)]/ij . The marginal
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value function for permits is v(i)  (̂i  )  ̂ii. An
equilibrium bidding strategy is i(e)  B  [2(̂j  ̂i
 ̂iB)e]/[̂i̂j  ̂j̂i  ̂i̂jB  (̂i  ̂j)]. Equilibrium
permit price is ê*  [̂i̂j  ̂j̂i  ̂i̂jB  (̂i  ̂j)]/
[2(̂i  ̂j)] and the equilibrium number of permits
received by firm i is ̂*i : i(ê*)  (̂i  ̂j  ̂jB)/
(̂i  ̂j). The profit function ̂i, after incorporating
equilibrium output, permit price, and permit share, is
a function of both i and j. Equilibrium values of
abatement correspond to the intersection of the reac-
tion functions ̂*1(2) and ̂*2(1).
Interestingly, we observe behavior analogous to
that described in Sections 4 and 5. In both demand
scenarios, we observe that as a firm gets dirtier, it
abates less, produces less, and obtains a smaller profit.
As expected, a firm abates less when its cost of abate-
ment or cost of production goes up. In addition, there
is evidence of a trade-off among firm cleanliness, the
corresponding cost of production, and firm profit. In
the example presented in Table 2, the cleaner firm has
a higher cost of production. In the combination 1  4,
c1  300, 2  6, c2  100, the cleaner firm, i.e., firm 1,
secures a larger profit, thus demonstrating that it can
pay to be clean even if the unit cost of production is
higher. But in the combination 1  5, c1  275, 2  6,
c2  100, the dirtier firm, i.e., firm 2, secures a larger
profit. A similar trade-off is observed in Table 3. In the
case of independent demands, firm profits increase in
the number of available permits. However, the profit
of the dirtier firm is more sensitive, in percentage
terms, to changes in the number of permits. In Table 2,
when B is reduced from 400 to 350, the cleaner firm’s
Table 2 Two-Firm Asymmetric Game: Numerical Example (Independent Demands)
Scenario *1 *2 y *1 y *2 e* *1 *2 *1 *2
Asymmetry in dirtinessa
1  4, 2  6 0.5263 0.4233 91.66 37.90 168.54 240.22 159.78 68,644.99 25,153.45
1  4, 2  8 0.4716 0.2811 108.90 16.66 130.79 296.00 104.00 86,887.47 11,037.92
Asymmetry in abatement costsb
1  30000, 2  50000 0.7896 0.4929 66.55 44.00 169.18 223.14 176.86 41,195.39 27,458.88
1  30000, 2  70000 0.7945 0.3572 71.43 36.46 162.35 238.84 161.16 45,352.56 23,876.44
Asymmetry in production costsc
c1  100, c2  200 0.5794 0.5222 59.27 44.36 172.06 225.16 174.84 39,521.26 26,287.56
c1  100, c2  300 0.5829 0.4707 66.09 36.64 163.45 250.52 149.48 45,957.49 20,065.64
Asymmetry in dirtiness and production costsd
1  4, 2  6; c1  300, c2  100 0.5000 0.4904 76.45 48.73 175.46 203.81 196.19 52,461.53 34,271.74
1  5, 2  6; c1  275, c2  100 0.5172 0.5436 57.40 54.24 174.63 189.16 210.84 36,131.29 36,755.20
Asymmetry in dirtiness, varying stringencye
B  400; 1  4, 2  8 0.4716 0.2811 108.90 16.66 130.79 296.00 104.00 86,887.47 11,037.92
B  350; 1  4, 2  8 0.4734 0.2416 107.89 8.86 132.80 292.91 57.09 85,899.31 5056.17
a (1  2  50000, c1  c2  200, a  2000, b  5, B  400);
b (1  2  6, c1  c2  200, a  2000, b  5, B  400);
c (1  2
 6, 1  2  50000, a  2000, b  5, B  400);
d (1  2  50000, a  2000, b  5, B  400);
e (1  2  50000, c1  c2  200,
a  2000, b  5).
Table 3 Two-Firm Asymmetric Game: Numerical Example (Cournot Competition)
Scenario ̂*1 ̂*2 ŷ *1 ŷ *2 ê* ̂*1 ̂*2 ̂*1 ̂*2
Asymmetry in dirtinessa
1  2, 2  4 0.1895 0.4325 113.42 74.96 86.55 190.69 209.31 79,025.29 36,855.05
1  2, 2  6 0.1134 0.2579 133.12 33.73 83.56 239.12 160.88 107,937.24 15,805.79
Asymmetry in abatement costsb
1  30000, 2  50000 0.6940 0.4969 87.36 72.50 119.42 206.26 193.74 48,335.77 37,071.91
1  30000, 2  70000 0.6960 0.3839 90.43 64.60 121.41 213.28 186.72 52,249.57 33,218.40
Asymmetry in production costsc
c1  100, c2  200 0.5830 0.5006 91.08 63.72 132.69 230.16 169.84 55,026.77 30,307.15
c1  100, c2  300 0.5798 0.4209 103.18 49.28 122.78 261.27 138.73 68,505.84 20,318.78
Asymmetry in dirtiness and production costsd
1  2, 2  6; c1  300, c2  100 0.1684 0.3731 112.46 47.49 98.73 192.49 207.51 80,820.29 24,802.71
1  5, 2  6; c1  275, c2  100 0.5685 0.6855 51.62 66.14 137.72 164.57 235.43 19,833.87 30,797.88
Asymmetry in dirtiness, varying stringencye
B  400; 1  2, 2  6 0.1134 0.2579 133.12 33.73 83.56 239.12 160.88 107,937.24 15,805.79
B  350; 1  2, 2  6 0.1264 0.1920 137.71 20.96 89.58 244.51 105.49 115,924.82 9804.01
a (1  2  50000, c1  c2  200, â  2000, b̂  5, B  400);
b (1  2  4, c1  c2  200, â  2000, b̂  5, B  400);
c (1  2
 4, 1  2  50000, â  2000, b̂  5, B  400);
d (1  2  50000, â  2000, b̂  5, B  400);
e (1  2  50000, c1  c2  200,
â  2000, b̂  5).
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profit goes down by just 1%, whereas the dirtier firm’s
profit goes down by 54%. In the case of competition,
the cleaner firm’s profit increases when the number of
permits is reduced. In Table 3, when B is reduced from
400 to 350, the cleaner firm’s profit goes up by 7%,
whereas the dirtier firm’s profit goes down by 38%.
Thus, in either demand scenario, the impact of increas-
ing stringency on profit is far less severe on the cleaner
firm than on the dirtier firm.
8. Discussion and Future Work
The crux of any market-based program for pollution
control is to allow firms to flexibly apply compliance
levers. This paper presents a methodology by which a
firm can derive its marginal value function for permits
and translate this value function into an optimal bid-
ding strategy in the auction for permits. In addition,
the modeling effort provides a means for firms to
deduce their optimal levels of abatement and output.
The model used in this paper is a fairly simple repre-
sentation of investment in abatement, permit bidding
and allocation, and production. Yet the interplay
among the elements in the model illustrates that the
behavior of equilibrium outcomes is intricate. The
findings in this paper can aid regulators in under-
standing how abatement levels, permit prices, and
industry output interact. At first glance, it might seem
that changing the total number of permits would in-
fluence abatement to a greater extent in a dirtier in-
dustry than in a cleaner one. However, we find the
opposite to be true. Our model also suggests that
equilibrium permit price can be low in a relatively
dirty industry because of a stiffer capacity limit, re-
sulting in a decrease in the value placed on permits, a
lower permit price in the auction, and lower produc-
tion levels. Reductions in the number of available
permits drive firms in a relatively dirty industry to
lower output levels. Industry structure influences
equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, in the case of
Cournot competition in the end-product market, a
reduction in the number of permits offered in the
auction can increase equilibrium firm profit in a rela-
tively clean industry. This is favorable from the view-
point of a regulator aiming to increase policy strin-
gency. Traditionally, firms lobby to roll back pollution
standards because of the lingering belief that stricter
environmental regulations erode competitiveness (Por-
ter and van der Linde 1995). But, in a competitive setting,
an excessive number of permits can be detrimental to
firm profit because of resultingly large industry capacity
that brings down product price and firm profit.
A promising observation is that our results are rea-
sonably robust to modeling assumptions. That struc-
tural behavior is preserved in our asymmetric two-
player game is especially encouraging. However,
several extensions to our work merit consideration in
future research. The timing of decisions in our model
represents situations where abatement investment de-
cisions are long-term in nature and occur at a slower
rate than the allocation of permits. However, in cases
where the abatement investment cycle is relatively
faster (e.g., as could be the case with switching from
high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal) or where the potential
cost of abatement investments drive decisions to lobby
against emissions caps, a sequence of decisions where
the allocation of permits precedes the abatement de-
cision might be more appropriate. Firms’ incentives to
lobby against emissions limits, given abatement costs
and forecasts of future environmental regulation, can
be modeled as in Lyon and Maxwell (2004). Our anal-
ysis treated imperfect, quantity competition. It would
be interesting to see how the results change with
perfect competition in the output market or when
firms decide on prices rather than quantities. Uncer-
tainty can be incorporated in end-product demand
and, hence, in the valuation of permits by firms. Un-
certainty can also be introduced in the regulator’s
choice of the emissions cap, in beliefs about the cost
structures of competitors, or in the likelihood of abate-
ment resulting from investment efforts. In practice,
permits can be banked for future use and investments
in abatement yield emissions reductions across multi-
ple time periods; an extension to multiple periods will
therefore be very insightful. Emissions permits are
also exchanged in markets outside of auctions through
brokered trades, electronic screens, or direct trades
between participants without an intermediary. Inter-
actions between permit auctions and such exchange
mechanisms are worth exploring. According to our
model, dirty firms find it cheaper at the margin to
reduce output rather than invest more in abatement in
response to increasing stringency. Regulators might
not necessarily desire output reductions or plant clo-
sures—outcomes that involve a variety of social
costs—but might prefer that firms make investments
in cleaning up their technologies and thus privately
bear the costs of reducing emissions. At the heart of
this discussion is the question of how many permits
the regulator should issue. Although we do not ad-
dress this important question, our construct may be of
use as a “what if” tool for the social planner to assess
the impact that the emissions cap has on firm profit-
ability, output, and abatement investment compared
to the social costs and benefits of allowing a certain
amount of pollution. Finally, in the spirit of Boven-
berg, Goulder, and Gurney (2004) and Smith, Ross,
and Montgomery (2002), our model could be extended
to incorporate the regulator’s choice of the fraction of
permits to grandfather in order to preserve “equity
values” in the affected industry.
Subramanian, Gupta, and Talbot: Compliance Strategies under Permits for Emissions
Production and Operations Management 16(6), pp. 763–779, © 2007 Production and Operations Management Society 775
Acknowledgments
We thank the editors and anonymous referees for their
helpful comments. We also thank Dr. William Lovejoy (Ross
School of Business, University of Michigan), Dr. Richard
Loulou (GERAD, McGill University), William Rogers (Air
Programs, Detroit Edison Co.), Constantine Blathras (US
EPA Region 5), and participants in INFORMS meetings, CU
Environmental and Resource Economics workshops, and sem-
inars at the Ross School of Business for their feedback. We
acknowledge the financial support of The Erb Institute and











Implying that *C is concave in . d*C/d  0 f *  B(a
 c)/4n, the profit-maximizing abatement level. 
Proof of Proposition 2a.
i. y*/B  [4n  2B(a  c)]/42n2  0. 
ii. *C/B  [(a  c)/2n]  [B(a  c)
2/82n2]  0. 
iii. */B  (a  c)/4n  0, since a  c  ̃u. 
Proof of Proposition 2b.
i. y*/  (B/2n)  B2(a  c)/23n2  0. 
ii. *C/  [B(a  c)/2
2n]  [B2(a  c)2/83n2]
 0. 
iii. */  [B(a  c)/42n]  0. 
iv. e*/  {[223n3(a  c)  8bB22n2  6bB2n(a
 c)  bB3(a  c)2  B2n2(a  c)2]/425n3};
 223n3(a  c)  8bB22n2  6bB2n(a  c)  0 for
  B[4b  24b22  3b(a  c)2]/2n(a  c),
and bB3(a  c)2  B2n2(a  c)2  0 for  
bB2/n2. Hence, e*/  0 for   max {B[4b
 24b22  3b(a  c)2]/2n(a  c), bB2/n2}. 
Proof of Proposition 2c.
i. 2y*/B  (1/2n)  [B(a  c)]/3n2  0. 
ii. 2*C/B  [(a  c)/2
2n]  [B(a  c)2/83n2]
 0. 
iii. 2*/B  [(a  c)/42n]  0. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proposed equilibrium satisfies
n  (ê*)  B. We show that if the (n  1) firms other
than firm i submit the schedule (e) then it is optimal
for firm i to also submit the same schedule (e). Assume
that firms j  i submit the schedule (e) and i submits
some schedule (e). The clearing price ê* satisfies
 ê*  B  n  1ê*




(̂  ̂z)dz  ê*  ê*
  ̂z  ̂ z22 
0
	2ê*B/n̂̂B
 ê*   2ê*Bn̂  ̂B
 ̂ 2ê*Bn̂  ̂B  2̂ ê*Bn̂  ̂B
2
  2ê*2Bn̂  ̂B (12)
The function on the right-hand side of (12) is concave in ê*
and is maximized with respect to ê* when
2̂Bn̂  ̂B  4̂B2ê*  4Bn̂  ̂Bê*  0,
i.e., when ê*  1
2
[̂  ̂(B/n)]. This is exactly the price that
will result if firm i submits the schedule (e). The result
follows. 











 2  0
Implying that ̂*C is concave in . d̂*C/d  0 yields ̂*
 [Bn(â  c)  2b̂B2(n  1)]/[2b̂B2(n  1)  42n2], the
profit-maximizing abatement level. 
Proof of Proposition 5a.
i.  ŷ*/B  1/n  0. 
ii. ̂*C/B  [(â  c)/2n]  [2b̂B(n  1)/2
2n2]
 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5b.
i.  ŷ*/  (B/2n)  0. 
ii. ̂*C/  [B(â  c)/2
2n]  [b̂B2(n  1)/3n2]
 0. 
iii. ê*/  [(â  c)/22]  (2b̂B/3n)  0 for 
 [4b̂B/n(â  c)]. 
Proof of Proposition 5c.
i. 2ŷ*/B  (1/2n)  0. 
ii. 2̂*C/B  [(â  c)/2
2n]  [2b̂B(n  1)/3n2]
 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5d.
i.  ŷ*/B  2n[Bn(â  c)  b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]/
[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]2. From the condition   ̆ we
have n  [b̂B(1  )2]/[(â  c)(1  )  b̂B(1  )2
 2u], implying Bn(â  c)  b̂B2(1  )(n  1)
 b̂B2(n  1), and therefore  ŷ*/B  0. 
ii. ̂*C/B  n[4
2n2(â  c)  8b̂Bn(n  1)  Bn(â
 c)2  2b̂B2(â  c)(n  1)]/2[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]2
 0. 
iii. ̂*/B  n[22n2(â  c)  8b̂Bn(n  1)  b̂B2(â
 c)(n  1)]/2[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]2  0 for   B[4b̂(n
 1)  16b̂22(n  1)2  2b̂(â  c)2(n  1)]/[2n(â
 c)]. 
Proof of Proposition 5e.
i.  ŷ*/  {2Bn[Bn(â  c)  b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]/
[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]2}. From the condition   ̆ we
have n  [b̂B(1  )2]/[(â  c)(1  )  b̂B(1  )2
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 2u], implying Bn(â  c)  b̂B2(1  )(n  1)
 b̂B2(n  1), and therefore  ŷ*/  0. 
ii. ̂*C/  {Bn[4
2n2(â  c)  8b̂Bn(n  1)
 Bn(â  c)2  2b̂B2(â  c)(n  1)]/2[b̂B2(n  1)
 22n2]2}  0. 
iii. ̂*/  {Bn[22n2(â  c)  8b̂Bn(n  1)  b̂B2(â
 c)(n  1)]/2[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]2}  0 for 
 B[4b̂(n  1)  16b̂22(n  1)2  2b̂(â  c)2(n  1)]/
[2n(â  c)]. 
iv. ê*/  {2n2[224n4(â  c)  4b̂B23n3(n  1)
 3b̂B22n2(â  c)(n  1)]/[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]3}
 {2n2[B3n3(â  c)2  b̂B3n(â  c)2  b̂2B4(â
 c)(n  1)]/[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]3}; 224n4(â  c)
 4b̂B23n3(n  1)  3b̂B22n2(â  c)(n  1)  0 for 
 B[2b̂(n  1)  4b̂22(n  1)2  6b̂(â  c)2(n  1)2]/
[2n(â  c)], and B3n3(â  c)2  b̂B3n(â  c)2  0 for
  b̂B2/n2. Hence, ê*/  0 for   max {B[2b̂(n
 1)  4b̂22(n  1)2  6b̂(â  c)2(n  1)2]/[2n(â 
c), b̂B2/n2}. 
Proof of Proposition 5f.
i. 2ŷ*/B  {2n[424n4  12b̂B22n2(n  1)
 4B3n3(â  c)  2b̂B3n2(â  c)]/[b̂B2(n  1)
 22n2]3}  {2n[2b̂B3n(â  c)  b̂2B4(n  1)2]/[b̂B2(n
 1)  22n2]3}; 424n4  12b̂B22n2(n  1)  0 for 
 [3b̂B2(n  1)/n2], and 4B3n3(â  c)  2b̂B3n2(â
 c)  0 for   b̂B2/2n. Hence, 2ŷ*/B  0 for 
 [3b̂B2(n  1)/n2], since n  2. 
ii. 2̂*C/B  {n[4
24n4(â  c)  16b̂B23n3(n  1)
 12b̂B22n2(â  c)(n  1)]/[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]3}
 {n[2B3n3(â  c)2  b̂B3n(â  c)2(n  1)]/[b̂B2(n
 1)  22n2]3}  {n[8b̂2B3n(n  1)2  b̂2B4(â  c)(n
 1)2]/[b̂B2(n  1)  22n2]3}; 2B3n3(â  c)2  b̂B3n(â
 c)2(n  1)  0 for   [b̂B2(n  1)/2n2],
and 4 24n4(â  c)  16b̂B 23n3(n  1)
 12b̂B22n2(â  c)(n  1)  0 for   {B[2b̂(n
 1)  4b̂2 2(n  1)2  3b̂(â  c)2(n  1)]/
[n(â  c)}. Hence, 2̂*C/B  0 for 
 max {[b̂B2(n  1)/ 2n2], B[2b̂(n  1)
 4b̂22(n  1)2  3b̂(â  c)2(n  1)]/[n(â  c)}. 
iii. 2̂*/B  {n[424n4(â  c)  32b̂B23n3(n  1)
 12b̂B22n2(â  c)(n  1)]/[2(b̂B2(n  1)  22n2)]3}
 {n[16b̂2B3n(n  1)2  b̂2B4n(â  c)(n  2)
 b̂2B4(â  c)]/[2(b̂B2(n  1)  22n2)]3}  0
for [424n4(â  c)  32b̂B23n3(n  1)  12b̂B22n2(â
 c)(n  1)]  0, i.e., for   {B[4b̂(n  1)
 16b̂22(n  1)2  3b̂(â  c)2(n  1)]/[n(â  c)]}. 
Appendix B
Tables
Table 4 Equilibrium Results—Sections 4 and 5 (Base Model)
Independent demands Competition
Abatement Ba  c
4n max Bn(â  c)  2b̂B2(n  1)2b̂B2(n  1)  42n2 , 0
Permit price
	4n  Ba  c
	22n2a  c  bB4n  Ba  c

1624n3
n	4n  Bâ  c
	b̂B2â  cn  3  4nnâ  c  b̂Bn  1

8	b̂B2n  1  22n2
2
,











B2a  c  4Bn
42n2
B2â  c  4Bn









B2â  c2  8b̂B2n  1  8Bnâ  c
8b̂B2n  1  162n2
,
Bnâ  c  b̂B2n  1
22n2
Table 5 Equilibrium Results—Section 7.1 (Variation of Emissions Function)
Independent demands Competition
Abatement 
2b  2 a  c  bBn 2nâ  c  b̂B3n  14nb̂n  2
Permit price 
2b  2 a  c  bBn bB22n b̂
2Bn  12  42	nâ  c  b̂Bn  1








2b  2 a  c  bBn Bn 2nâ  c  b̂B3n  14nb̂n  2  Bn
Profit 1





b̂2B2n  12  4	nâ  c  2B
	b̂Bn  1  nâ  c

162n2b̂n  2
Note. To ensure nonnegative equilibrium values of abatement and output, (â  c)  [b̂B(3n  1)/2n] for the case of competition.
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